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Brazil and the 2008 panic  
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Brazil before the crisis: the asset price boom and economic upswing 
Although the subprime crisis started in the summer of 2007 (in the northern hemisphere), it 
only reached Brazil, and emerging markets in general, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
Major central banks at the core of the crisis responded by aggressively easing policy from 
mid-2007, while also introducing measures to help revive interbank funding markets. Thus, 
capital flows to emerging markets, most of which had deleveraged and strengthened fiscal 
and monetary policy frameworks in previous years, were initially spared.  
Emerging economies with rigid exchange rate regimes imported the monetary policy stance 
prevailing in mature economies, which was ill-suited to their own cyclical positions and, as a 
result, started to experience faster growth, asset price appreciation and, in several cases, 
rising inflationary pressures. Even emerging economies, such as Brazil, with flexible foreign 
exchange regimes, started to see faster asset price appreciation (partly derived from the 
improvement in the sovereign rating), stronger economic growth, as well as accelerating 
inflation.  
Thus, equity prices (the Brazilian stock index – IBOVESPA) rose by 20% (in local currency) 
between June 2007 and June 2008 (44% in USD terms). The local capital market saw 
R$ 165 billion of issuance, equivalent to around 5.6% of GDP (a new activity record), thereby 
helping to fund Brazilian corporates. At the same time, bank credit rose from 32% to 36% of 
GDP. Not surprisingly, the economy accelerated, with year-on-year GDP growth rising from 
5.4% to 6.8% between Q3 2007 and Q3 2008, while domestic demand growth rose from 
7.7% to 9.5%. Between June 2007 and June 2008, as economic activity strengthened, led by 
domestic demand, the current account balance went from a surplus equivalent to 1.1% of 
GDP to a deficit of 1.4% of GDP, while accumulated inflation rose from 3.7% to 6.1% and 
12-month ahead inflation expectations increased from 3.5% to 5.3% – above the 4.5% 
central target.  
The Banco Central do Brazil (BCB) thus undertook a monetary tightening, aimed at aligning 
the speeds of aggregate demand and supply growth, as well as reining in inflation 
expectations, with the ultimate goal of bringing inflation back to its target. On the regulatory 
front, the BCB had taken measures in 2007 to limit financial institutions’ exposure to 
exchange rate volatility.
3 Those measures proved their worth in the 2008 panic, by limiting 
the direct exposure of Brazilian banks to the strong currency depreciation seen between 
August and December 2008. 
The macroeconomic scenario changed suddenly and sharply in Q4 2008 in the aftermath of 
the failure of Lehman Brothers and the heightened stress in global financial markets. There is 
no doubt that Brazil was better prepared to face the crisis than in previous periods. 
Nevertheless, the crisis led to a substantial tightening of financial conditions in foreign and 
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local currency and had a negative impact on consumer and business confidence and, of 
course, on economic activity.  
This was a global crisis, and its strongest initial effect was BRL depreciation, which resulted 
from the global USD liquidity squeeze as well as from the terms of trade deterioration 
brought about by falling commodity prices (Graph 1). 














































































































CRB Nominal effective exchange rate
 
Source: Bloomberg, Banco Central do Brasil. 
 
The exchange rate depreciation was magnified by the effects of non-financial corporate 
exposure to foreign exchange derivatives.
4 BCB research, based on supervision data and 
information on bank client positions in the clearing house CETIP SA (Balcão Organizado de 
Ativos e Derivativos), shows that such exposure was close to $ 37 billion (delta) by the end 
of September 2008. This estimate was taken into account in the BCB’s crisis management 
strategy.  
The USD liquidity squeeze had many aspects. The volume of export finance contracts, 
dubbed ACC, fell by 30% between September and October, while the rollover ratio of 
external debt fell from an average of 167% in January–October to only 22% in November. 
Short-term foreign funding of Brazilian banks contracted sharply from August – cumulative 
net remittances reached R$ 11.4 billion in the second half of 2008. Finally, externally funded 
domestic credit, adjusting for exchange rate changes, fell by 11% between August and 
October 2008.  
Note also that, as in other sectors of the economy, Brazilian banks took advantage of the 
pre-Lehman Brothers period of high global liquidity and rising sovereign credit ratings to 
increase debt and equity issuance to domestic and foreign investors. Specifically, in 2007, 11 
small- and medium-sized banks (with a net worth of less than R$ 7 billion), issued R$ 6.2 
billion in equities (initial and secondary offers) with the significant participation of foreign 
investors. With a bolstered equity base, small- and medium-sized banks could accelerate 
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loan growth – this trend was also favoured by their presence in the fast-growth payroll-
backed credit segment.  
In Brazil, the funding of smaller institutions is normally based on time deposits by a limited 
number of institutional investors, whereas bigger banks rely on retail funding. Well-
established Brazilian market practice, due to years of macroeconomic turbulence and high 
volatility, requires that banks effectively offer short-term liquidity to their deposits, regardless 
of the original nominal maturity. Therefore, the concentration of deposits seems to be far 
more relevant from the viewpoint of liquidity risk than (apparent) duration.  
Thus, a combination of structural factors, such as a reliance on concentrated sources of 
funding, as well as cyclical factors, such as the USD liquidity squeeze in a context of fast 
credit expansion, made smaller Brazilian institutions vulnerable to a domestic liquidity 
squeeze. Added to this was a process of flight to quality, that is, towards assets with explicit 
or implicit federal government guarantees, and away from private debt, which affected not 
only the funding of smaller banks but also led to pressure on some investment funds. Finally, 
the increase in asset price volatility, especially equities and the exchange rate, led to a 
substantial rise of margin requirements at the São Paulo Mercantile and Futures Exchange 
(BMF) and the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) – from R$ 72 billion, on average, in 
August, to R$ 93.6 billion in December. These developments led to the BRL liquidity squeeze 
described in Table 1, in which available liquidity is defined as the sum of cash reserves, 




Liquidity availability utilisation  
Class  8 Sep 2008 - 12 Sep 2008  6 Oct - 10 Oct 2008 















share of the 
payments 
(%) 
0 - 30%  83  90.8  29  75.5  88  94.8 
30-70% 20  8.8  36  19.1  15  4.2 
70-100% 3  0.4  41  5.3  3  1.0 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil. 
 
The data shows that the number of financial conglomerates displaying high liquidity utilisation 
jumped from three to 41 in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. On the other 
hand, the volume of payments affected was relatively modest, as deposits flew from smaller 
to larger institutions but not outside the system. Moreover, by mid-November, the system had 
already overcome the more acute liquidity squeeze – although the implications of tight 
banking sector liquidity on credit growth were to be felt for much longer.  
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Crisis management: liquidity provision in USD and BRL 
The various BCB initiatives to tackle the liquidity issues, in BRL and USD, were adjusted to 
market conditions at every stage of the crisis but followed certain basic principles. The first 
was to prevent crisis management from jeopardising the monetary policy regime, namely 
inflation targeting and a floating exchange rate. The second was to minimise BCB financial 
exposure to private sector decisions. The third principle was to avoid rewarding excessive 
risk-taking by the private sector, which would have increased moral hazard within the 
system. The BCB also acknowledged that there was intense uncertainty regarding the 
duration of the crisis – this meant preparing for a scenario of protracted global financial 
turmoil.  
With regard to USD liquidity provision, uncertainty about the duration of the crisis led the 
BCB to undertake not only sales of USD spots but also repo auctions, thereby signalling that 
it was prepared to supply liquidity for a long time, while also mitigating the risk of a fast 
depletion of foreign exchange reserves. Such risk was limited, too, by accepting that the 
exchange rate had to respond to the change in fundamentals, even if that implied some initial 
overshooting. Nevertheless, the BCB acted in a timely way to alleviate the liquidity squeeze 
in the USD market – repo USD auctions were announced on 18 September and the first one 
took place a day later, on 19 September. It should also be noted that, although the BCB 
provided liquidity while allowing the exchange rate to adjust, it never adopted any preset limit 
for its USD operations.  
Overall, the BCB sold US$ 14.5 billion (7% of total reserves as of end-August 2008) on the 
spot market from 8 October through auctions to foreign exchange dealer banks, following the 
same structure as those employed in the building up of foreign exchange reserves, ie at the 
going market price. With the normalisation of liquidity, such auctions were discontinued from 
February 2009. At the same time, the BCB placed US$ 11.8 billion through repo auctions, 
also operating with foreign exchange dealer banks.  
The BCB innovated through the introduction of a window for foreign exchange reserve 
lending aimed at supporting trade finance. Lending, rather than selling, reserves was seen as 
an approach that was both more prudent and efficient than simply selling reserves. Since the 
goal was to ensure a minimal supply of liquidity to trade finance, the loan auctions were open 
to all banks that operated in the Brazilian foreign exchange market rather than just the dealer 
banks. Setting up this window required not only substantial operational measures within the 
BCB but also changes in legislation.
6 The first loan auction took place on 20 October, and the 
whole programme reached US$ 12.6 billion, of which US$ 9 billion was targeted at the ACC 
market.  
Another innovation was the agreement, announced on 29 October 2009, of a currency swap 
arrangement with the Federal Reserve.
7 The arrangement was essentially seen from the 
beginning as a signalling device, despite the absence of a pre-commitment to use the 
available funds, which could reach $ 30 billion. Its goals were, on the one hand, to level the 
playing field for Brazilian banks in their foreign issuance, as the Federal Reserve had already 
announced swap arrangements with other central banks and, on the other hand, to signal the 
importance of the Brazilian financial system to global market participants, in a context of 
heightened differentiation among emerging economies. The swap announcement seems to 
have been effective in boosting confidence and thereby in reining in expectations of further 
foreign exchange volatility, even though the BCB did not tap the facility.
8  
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Besides providing liquidity to the spot market, the BCB also acted in the derivatives markets, 
specifically the foreign exchange swap market. In the pre-crisis boom period, the BCB had 
built up a long USD position in foreign exchange swaps, which reached $ 23 billion by June 
2008. The exposure of non-financial corporates to foreign exchange derivatives led to major 
imbalances in the futures market, which inevitably added to pressure on the spot market. 
Under those circumstances, the BCB started to unwind its reverse swap position (BCB long 
USD) and, from the beginning of October, started to sell traditional swaps (BCB short USD), 
thus providing a hedging device to its counterparties.  
Given the considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of exposures to foreign exchange 
derivatives among non-financial corporates, foreign exchange market volatility rose 
significantly. Thus, it was important to act promptly to re-establish normal conditions and 
price-setting in the futures market. In that regard, the BCB announced, on 23 October 2008, 
that it would sell up to $ 50 billion of foreign exchange swaps. This amount was set by taking 
account of both the estimated size of foreign exchange exposures, hence the size of the 
potential demand for hedge, and the magnitude of foreign exchange reserves. The latter 
aspect was important because announcing an exaggeratedly large supply of swaps (relative 
to total reserves) might have led to the perception that the BCB wanted to prevent the 
currency from adjusting, eliciting the kind of one-way bet that characterises speculative 
attacks. Therefore, the announced volume of up to $ 50 billion was equivalent to around 25% 
of pre-crisis reserves. With the positive effects of the package of measures and the gradual 
normalisation of international financial conditions, actual sales of swaps only reached   
$ 12 billion. 
Besides providing USD liquidity, the BCB had to ensure adequate liquidity conditions in local 
currency. This meant not simply increasing the liquidity available to the system, but rather 
channelling it to where it was needed. It should be noted that there was no deposit drain at a 
systemic level, only an increase in concentration within large-sized institutions. In aggregate 
terms, bank deposits actually rose, partly as a result of migration from investment funds that 
were exposed to the equity market into time deposits.  
After the failure of Lehman Brothers, increased risk aversion led to a concentration of 
deposits in large institutions. Thus, between August 2008 and January 2009, while total 
deposits grew by 13%, deposits in large banks rose by 20%, and those in medium- and 
small-sized institutions experienced declines of 11% and 23%, respectively.  
Against this background, the BCB took measures to alleviate the liquidity squeeze while 
ensuring that monetary policy decisions were focused on its macroeconomic objective, 
namely to align inflation to its targets. This followed the separation principle, that is, the 
segmentation between monetary policy and liquidity management, a well-established 
operational concept in central banking.
9 It is important to recall that, in the acute period of the 
crisis, from September to October 2008, inflation expectations, and the BCB’s own inflation 
forecasts, were clearly overshooting the targets. This resulted from the acceleration of 
inflation and intense utilisation of production factors seen before the crisis, as well as from 
the substantial currency depreciation that followed its onset. Under such circumstances, 
premature policy easing, which could not have contemporaneous effects on activity, would 
have had negative implications for inflation expectations, jeopardising the credibility of the 
BCB’s commitment to price stability and therefore preventing the central bank from taking 
action that, with appropriate timing, had important anticyclical effects.  
Thus, the BCB and the National Monetary Council (CMN) implemented a series of liquidity 
management measures, adapting the policy response to the changing conditions in the 
                                                  




10 Over time, when market segmentation between small and larger institutions 
became stronger, measures became more targeted. Such measures involved three areas: 
reserve requirements; the Deposit Insurance Fund (FGC); and the discount window.  
Reserve requirements reached R$ 250 billion in the immediate pre-crisis period. Simulations 
based on pre-crisis rules show that the amount of reserve requirements would have reached 
R$ 295 billion by end-August 2009, compared with the actual observed volume of R$ 179 
billion. Thus, the reserve requirements released amounted to around R$ 116 billion, or 4% of 
GDP at 2009 prices. The bulk of the released funds referred to drawdowns of the so-called 
“additional requirements” (that had been introduced in the 2002 crisis) of R$ 42 billion, and of 
requirements on time deposits (R$ 62 billion).
11  
Moreover, reserve requirement rebates were used to spread liquidity throughout the system. 
This was achieved through incentives for the use of released funds in the acquisition of 
assets of small- and medium-sized banks. Specifically, the authorities introduced deductions 
of reserve requirements on deposits from leasing companies and on time deposits subject to 
restrictions: they were to be used to buy assets from other banks provided that (a) there were 
no asset purchases within the same financial conglomerate; (b) the selling bank had equity of 
less than R$ 7 billion; and (c) purchases from a single institution did not exceed 20% of the 
reserve requirements (held in cash) of the acquiring bank.  
Reserve requirement rebates were also directed at USD purchases by the banks so as to 
offset the effects of USD sales by the BCB on local currency liquidity – Circulares no 3.412 of 
13 October 2008 and no 3.427 of 19 December 2008.  
In addition, there was a substantial overhaul of regulation regarding the discount window. 
Specifically, Law no 11.882 and CMN Resolution no 3.622 established that discount window 
operations could have tenor of up to 359 days, as well as criteria for the acceptance and 
pricing of banks’ assets and enabled the BCB to impose corrective actions to institutions that 
relied on that window. The initiative also involved several operational measures within the 
BCB regarding data transfer, analysis and pricing of loan portfolios that were deemed 
necessary in order to set in place a timely and efficient discount window facility. However, 
beyond ordinary intraday loans, the discount window was not used during the crisis, as 
banks feared the stigma effect.  
The crisis highlighted the flexibility and usefulness of the Deposit Guarantee Fund (FGC) 
within the system’s safety net. In addition to enhancing its ability to buy assets from banks, 
the FGC introduced a programme of bank certificates of deposit purchases.
12 Finally, in 
March 2009, the authorities introduced Guaranteed Time Deposits (DPGE), backed by the 
FGC, with tenors from six to 60 months. Those deposits were limited to R$ 20 million per 
account per bank and required that the issuing banks increased their contributions to the 
FGC. The introduction of the DPGE succeeded in reviving issuance by smaller institutions – 
the amount of time deposits in small banks rose by around 24% between March and May 
2009. The timing of the introduction of DPGE was important since, as shown by international 
experience during the crisis, the setting up of guarantee mechanisms in periods of high 
stress can be counterproductive because it can risk stigmatising entire classes of institutions, 
with negative effects on liquidity distribution.  
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19 December 2008.  
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This comprehensive set of measures, adopted in a sequential way, succeeded in ending the 
liquidity squeeze, favouring a credit recovery, initially to households and later to corporates. 
The re-acceleration of credit also benefited from actions by state-owned banks, which gained 
market share during the crisis. This increase in market share was first seen on the liability 
side (as state-owned banks enjoy a de facto government guarantee) and later on the asset 
side – large public sector banks accounted for 34% of total credit by June 2009, compared 
with 28% by August 2008. It should be noted that the increased role of the state in the 
financial sector, in the aftermath of the 2008 panic, was not unique to Brazil.  
Conclusion 
Several lessons can be drawn from the Brazilian experience during the financial crisis. With 
regard to monitoring and prevention, it is clear that the trading of derivatives should, as far as 
possible, be confined to organised exchanges rather than over-the-counter (OTC) in order to 
prevent problems such as those faced by Brazilian non-financial corporates from remaining 
hidden for too long. Intra-agency cooperation should also be strengthened, whether between 
central banks and securities supervisors within jurisdictions or between central banks in 
different jurisdictions.  
In relation to liquidity management in local currency, the Brazilian experience shows that, 
although costly in terms of systemic efficiency over the medium-term, reserve requirements 
can be an extremely effective and flexible policy tool in crisis scenarios. However, the lack of 
demand for discount window operations highlights the importance of the stigma issue and 
shows that liquidity auctions, in the form of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility 
(TAF) could also be important additional tools. The crisis also highlighted the importance of 
broadening the range of institutions that are eligible to borrow from the central bank – 
including the FGC and systemically important clearing houses.
13 
The crisis showed that having adequate buffers of foreign exchange reserves is very 
important: it enabled the BCB to restore liquidity conditions in the foreign exchange market 
while allowing the exchange rate to adjust to changing fundamentals. Moreover, having 
reserves enabled the BCB to enter a currency swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve, 
which helped to contain currency volatility. Having adequate reserves allowed the BCB to 
mitigate a “double drain” scenario, characterised by liquidity squeezes in foreign and local 
currency.
14 Additionally, self-reliance, rather than reliance on shared reserves, proved useful 
in a crisis situation in which timely action was essential. The crisis also showed that direct 
intervention in derivatives markets, if they become dysfunctional and start affecting price-
setting in the spot market, may be quite effective.  
Finally, we note that the crisis was not a failure of inflation targeting. Rather, it was a failure 
of bank and financial supervision in some mature economies, not all of them practitioners of 
inflation targeting. Economies such as Brazil which, under fully fledged inflation targeting, 
adopted prudent monetary policies and conservative prudential rules, were hit by the crisis at 
a late stage, emerged faster from it and saw smaller and less persistent deviations from the 
price stability objective. This is another important lesson from the crisis.  
                                                  
13  This last provision is included in a draft legislative proposal that the BCB placed in public consultation in 
October 2009.  
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